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This paper exploits a unique data set on bank–ﬁrm relationships based on syndicated loan deals to exam-
ine the effect of banks’ credit risk and capital on ﬁrms’ risk and performance. Our data set is a multilevel
cross-section, which essentially allows controlling for all bank and ﬁrm characteristics through respective
ﬁxed effects, thus avoiding concerns regarding omitted variables. We ﬁnd that banks with higher credit
risk are associated with more risky ﬁrms, with lower proﬁtability and market value. In turn, we ﬁnd that
banks with higher risk-weighted capital ratios lend to riskier ﬁrms with less market value. Our results are
indicative of a strong adverse selection mechanism and highlight the need to monitor the risky banks
more closely, especially as we consider large and inﬂuential syndicated loan deals.
 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction a special type of cherry-pick, where the ﬁnancially healthy banksWhat are the characteristics of banks that lend to ﬁrms with
relatively high risk and low performance? The answer to this ques-
tion has fundamental implications for the understanding of the
bank–ﬁrm relationship lending, ﬁnancial stability and real macroe-
conomic outcomes. Surprisingly, despite the presence of a promi-
nent literature on relationship lending, this issue has been under-
researched. In this paper, we aim to ﬁll this gap in the literature
by empirically analyzing the relation between ﬁrm risk and perfor-
mance on the one hand, and bank capital and credit risk on the
other.
The main proposition of our analysis is that banks with differen-
tial levels of credit risk and capital will be associated with ﬁrms
with differential risk and performance. Speciﬁcally, risky and less
proﬁtable ﬁrms can have a difﬁcult time obtaining credit from
banks with relatively low levels of credit risk in their portfolios
(risk-averse banks). In turn, banks with higher levels of credit risk
are usually inclined to lend to more risky and less proﬁtable ﬁrms
(Peek and Rosengren, 2005). Thus, causality in this type of bank–
ﬁrm relationship runs in both directions. The end result is one ofare associated with ﬁnancially healthy ﬁrms and the less healthy
banks are associated with the less proﬁtable ﬁrms (Jones et al.,
2005).
The possible role of bank capital in the nexus between banks
and ﬁrms is less straightforward. On the positive side, banks with
higher capital ratios are those with more prudent behavior in all
their activities, including lending to less risky and proﬁtable ﬁrms
(Diamond and Rajan, 2000, 2001; Gorton and Winton, 2000). On
the negative side, a high capital ratio is a strong safety net for bank
managers, who therefore face increased incentives to lend to risky
borrowers that the bank would not be associated with if the level
of capital was lower (Dahl and Shrieves, 1992; Bhattacharya and
Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; Murﬁn, 2012).
We test the presence of these bank–ﬁrm relationships using
data from the syndicated loan market. This market is ideal for
our empirical tests because it usually involves large, systemically
important banks and ﬁrms and it is a relatively competitive mar-
ket. Thus, we expect that the results in other more traditional
bank–ﬁrm relationships would be even more pronounced if pre-
sent in the syndicated loan market. Moreover, the data from the
syndicated loan market have a unique characteristic. They repre-
sent the only source of information at the loan-level, with addi-
tional information on who is the lender (the lead bank–arrangerarket. J.
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ing of these data with information on the bank and ﬁrm character-
istics, which are invaluable in the empirical examination of the
question ‘‘who lends to risky and non-performing ﬁrms.’’
To this end, we build a unique data set on loan, bank, and ﬁrm
characteristics, and analyze the nexus between ﬁrm risk and per-
formance, and bank credit risk and capitalization. Theoretically,
the direction of the causality in our analysis is not an issue. We
aim to identify the nature of the bank–ﬁrm relationships and not
which of the two parties initiates this relationship. However, a
potential bias in our estimates may come from omitted variables
bias, as there are many unobserved reasons behind the choice to
lend to a speciﬁc ﬁrm or borrow from a speciﬁc bank. On this front,
the structure of our sample has the additional merit that is a mul-
tilevel cross-sectional data set, with the different levels stemming
from the fact that the same bank has given many loans in each time
period and the same ﬁrm has obtained more than one loans within
the same period. This allows including both bank and ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects, which effectively eliminate the omitted variables bias in
our empirical models.
Our results show that banks with high credit-risk ratios are
strongly associated with ﬁrms with high proﬁt volatility, lower
market value, and lower proﬁtability. With small modiﬁcations,
these ﬁndings hold irrespective of the variables used to proxy the
credit risk of banks and are economically signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcally,
a 1% point increase in our preferred measure of bank credit risk
is associated with an increase in the volatility of the return on
assets for the mean ﬁrm from 0.022 to 0.026 and a decrease in
the risk-adjusted returns of the mean ﬁrm from 20.3 to 14.5.
These results reveal a disconcerting afﬁliation of risky banks with
risky ﬁrms, yielding a bad equilibrium in the market for credit.
Given that this equilibrium is observed in the syndicated loan mar-
ket, which brings together relatively large banks and ﬁrms, this can
be a recipe for a turmoil in both the banking (and by extension in
ﬁnancial) and the products markets.
The role of bank capital in deﬁning the bank–ﬁrm relationships
is also quite important for the bank–ﬁrms relationships. We ﬁnd
that banks with high risk-weighted capital ratios are associated
with ﬁrms with high volatility of returns and low market value.
These ﬁndings are in line with the idea that overcapitalized banks
will tend to take on higher risk in search for yield, which is in line
with the adverse selection and moral hazard mechanisms of the
capital-regulation theory (Hellmann et al., 2000). We contend that
our results have important implications for prudential regulation
in light of the recent revisions under the impulse of Basel III.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes
the theoretical links between ﬁrm risk and performance, and bank
credit risk and capital. Section 3 discusses the data and the
variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the
empirical identiﬁcation method and presents the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes with the policy implications of our
ﬁndings.2. Theoretical considerations
The literature on relationship lending highlights a number of
beneﬁcial effects of close bank–ﬁrm relationships. The most nota-
ble of these effects are the alleviation of liquidity constraints of
ﬁrms due to the reduction in adverse selection and moral hazard
problems and the longer-term horizon of investment decisions
(e.g., Rajan, 1992; Hoshi et al., 1991). However, a more recent
strand of this literature also highlights some wrinkles in the
beneﬁcial effects of relationship lending. For example, Giannetti
(2003) shows that banks can renew lending to insolvent projectsPlease cite this article in press as: Iosiﬁdi, M., Kokas, S. Who lends to riskier an
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bank insolvency and ﬁnancial instability.
The seminal paper on the theory of the selection of borrowers
by banks is the one by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In this model,
banks are unable to observe the exact riskiness of borrowers, thus
they offer the same type of loan contracts to all ﬁrms. One problem
with this modelling framework is that, in the real world, bank
managers tend to cherry-pick borrowers based on speciﬁc screen-
ing devices such as collateral (e.g. Bester, 1985). This immediately
suggests that banks have a clear view about the different risk levels
of potential borrowers, especially as informational asymmetry
problems decrease.
The opposite argument concerning the decisions of banks with
different level of capital and credit risk to lend to healthy or less
healthy ﬁrms is quite under-researched. The theoretical debate
on this front can be traced in the work of Peek and Rosengren
(2005) for the misallocation of credit to relatively weak ﬁrms. In
a world with relatively lax regulatory supervision, banks follow a
policy of forbearance with the troubled borrowers to avoid increas-
ing their own loan-loss reserves, which will impair their capital
ratios. Subsequently, the risky banks will be incentivized to extend
their line of credit to troubled borrowers, so as to enable these bor-
rowers to make interest payments on outstanding credit.
This line of reasoning also works in the opposite direction as
well, from troubled ﬁrms to the worse-performing banks. The less
proﬁtable and risky ﬁrms will have a tough time borrowing from a
healthy bank, which is likely to have superior managerial and
monitoring capacity as a means to reduce adverse selection and
moral hazard in the lending process. Thus, these ﬁrms are likely
to turn to less risk-averse banks, which have a history of lending
to riskier ﬁrms. These banks will likely be characterized by higher
levels of non-performing loans and loan-loss provisions, informa-
tion which is ex post disclosed to the public on a quarterly basis.
Thus, we expect that risky (worse performing) ﬁrms are likely to
be afﬁliated with risky banks and vice versa, especially when we
call risky banks those with a relatively high amount of credit risk
in their portfolios.
The proposition on the relationship between risky banks and
risky ﬁrms is a special type of a more hazard problem, which how-
ever has some element of adverse selection in that the problem
precedes the loan deal. Thus, we are referring here to a variant of
the Akerlof (1970) – type lemon’s problem, whereby the low-qual-
ity ﬁrms will be left to choose the low-quality banks and vice versa,
even if information is complete. This state of affairs creates a
vicious cycle with an association of low quality ﬁrms and banks,
which for markets as important as the syndicated loan market
can be a recipe for banking instability.
In contrast, the role of capital in the banks’ decision to lend to
relatively riskier and lower-proﬁtability ﬁrms is usually studied
within the theoretical bank capital regulation literature. This lit-
erature makes contradicting predictions about the role of bank
capital. Diamond and Rajan (2000), Diamond and Rajan, (2001)
and Gorton and Winton (2000) propose a number of mechanisms
(quoted as ﬁnancial fragility mechanisms) through which higher
bank capitalization reduces lending and, thus, credit risk. The high-
light of this inﬂuential literature is that bank capital diminishes the
ﬁnancial fragility that facilitates the lending process and will
‘‘crowd out’’ deposits. The resulting effect is a safer banking system
through the reduction of the credit risk of banks. However, this lit-
erature is, in general, silent on the type of ﬁrms that the well-
capitalized banks tend to be associated with.
The opposite result is established by giving bank capital the role
of risk buffer, which expands banks’ risk-bearing capacity (e.g.,
Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004). In this framework,
the well-capitalized banks have increased incentives to extend
their credit to relatively risky borrowers, because holding tood lower-proﬁtability ﬁrms? Evidence from the syndicated loan market. J.
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions and sources.
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Dependent variables
r(ROA) The variance of ﬁrm ROA, where ROA is the
ratio of proﬁts before taxes to total assets
and r(ROA) is calculated over a rolling
window of 12 quarters
Compustat
Market value Natural logarithm of the market value of
common stock of ﬁrms
Compustat
Sharpe ROA/ r(ROA), where ROA is the ratio of
proﬁts before taxes to total assets and
r(ROA) is calculated over a rolling window
of 12 quarters
Compustat
ROA Ratio of proﬁts before taxes to total assets Compustat
Firm-level explanatory variables
Firm size Natural logarithm of the dollar value of ﬁrms’
sales
Compustat
Firm efﬁciency Ratio of ﬁrm sales to total assets Compustat
Firm liquidity Ratio of current assets to current liabilities Compustat
Firm age Firm age in years Compustat
Borrowing
spread
All-in-one spread of the average ﬁrms’ loan
deals
Thomson
Reuters
General
covenants
Dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm uses
general covenants in its loan deals and zero
otherwise
Thomson
Reuters
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empirical studies (e.g., Jokipii and Milne, 2011; Dahl and
Shrieves, 1992) document a positive relationship between capital
buffers (i.e., the distance of the actual level of capital from its
regulatory minimum) and bank risk. Further, the recent paper of
Murﬁn (2012) shows that well-capitalized banks tend to write
looser contracts with their borrowers, while reductions in equity
capital will lead to stricter contracts. This effect is consistent with
the idea that undercapitalized banks are more cautious in their
risk-taking strategies to shield their already low levels of capital
from further deterioration.
It becomes quite apparent, that the role of capital in the bank–
ﬁrm relationships is ambiguous. If banks operate under the ﬁnan-
cial-fragility mechanism, then they will curtail lending especially
to the more risky ﬁrms. If banks operate under the capacity
mechanism, which seems to be the dominant mechanism in the
existing empirical literature, they will possibly expand their risky
activities to ﬁrms with less healthy balance sheets.
On the basis of the above theoretical considerations and empiri-
cal facts we can formulate the following two testable hypotheses:
H1. Banks with higher credit risk will be associated with more
risky and worse-performing ﬁrms.Bank-level explanatory variables
Bank capital Ratio of total bank capital to total assets FDIC Call
Reports
Bank risk-
weighted
Ratio of risk-based bank capital to risk-
weighted assets
FDIC Call
ReportsH2. The better capitalized banks will most probably be associated
with more risky and worse-performing ﬁrms.capital
Bank Tier 1
capital
Ratio of Tier 1 bank capital to risk-weighted
assets
FDIC Call
Reports
Bank non-
performing
loans
Ratio of bank non-performing loans to total
loans
FDIC Call
Reports
Bank loan-loss
provisions
Ratio of bank loan-loss provisions to total
loans
FDIC Call
Reports
Bank loan
charge-offs
Ratio of bank net loan charge-offs to total
loans
FDIC Call
Reports
Bank size Natural logarithm of total bank assets FDIC Call
Reports
Bank Z-score (Bank ROA + Bank capital)/Bank r(ROA),
where Bank ROA is the ratio of proﬁts before
taxes to total assets and Bank capital is as
above
FDIC Call
Reports
Other variables
Crisis dummy Dummy variable equal to one for the years
2007 and 2008 and zero otherwise
Own
calculations3. Data
In the empirical analysis we aim to identify the characteristics
of banks, in terms of capital and credit risk, that lend to risky
and relatively poor-performing ﬁrms. Thus, we estimate an empiri-
cal model of the form:
Rft ¼ f ðFft; Llt;Bbt;uftÞ; ð1Þ
where R is a measure of risk or performance of ﬁrm f at the time of
the loan origination t. In turn, R is a linear function of a vector of
ﬁrm characteristics F that affect R, a vector of loan characteristics
L, and a vector of the lead arranger’s (lead bank’s) characteristics
B that include the capital and credit-risk proﬁle of the bank.
Finally, u is the stochastic disturbance, which for identiﬁcation pur-
poses includes both bank and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects as we will further
discuss below.
Our sample consists of US syndicated loan deals that occur at a
speciﬁc point in time (year of the loan deal), which deﬁne the
bank–ﬁrm relationships. We examine the characteristics, mainly
risk and capital, of the lead arranger in relation with the risk and
performance of the borrowing ﬁrm. We collect our data from three
different sources, with the cross-sectional observations of bank–
ﬁrm relationships spanning the period 2000–2012.
Our source for the syndicated loan deals is the Thomson
Reuters’ Thomson One Banker database.1 This database provides
information on the loan deal’s characteristics (amount, maturity,
borrowing spread, performance pricing, etc.). Thomson One Banker
also provides information for the members of the syndicate, the lead
bank, and the ﬁrm that receives the loan. This allows matching the
information from Thomson One Banker to the FDIC Call Reports,
which is our second data source. With this matching process we
obtain accounting bank data on a number of bank characteristics.
These data are quarterly and we use the information on the date1 Most empirical studies on syndicated loans use the DealScan database. However,
the Thomson One Banker database has also been used by a large number of studies as
the source for syndicated loan deals and its coverage is very similar with that of
DealScan for our sample period.
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Reports. Our ﬁnal data source is Compustat, which provides account-
ing data for the ﬁrms that received the loan. These data are invalu-
able to measure ﬁrms’ performance and obtain other control
variables in our estimated models.
The matching process of data from the three databases yields a
maximum of 7362 observations (loan deals). However, the number
of observations used for the regressions depends on the availability
of data for the variables used in our empirical analysis. These
observations comprise a so-called multilevel data set, which has
observations on banks and ﬁrms (lower level) and loan deals (high-
er level). This is a unique feature that proves particularly helpful
for econometric identiﬁcation purposes. Table 1 formally deﬁnes
all the variables used in the empirical analysis and Table 2 offers
summary statistics. We discuss these variables in turn.3.1. Measures of ﬁrm risk and performance
We use four measures of ﬁrm risk and performance that capture
a variety of relevant aspects of ﬁrms. The ﬁrst is the standardd lower-proﬁtability ﬁrms? Evidence from the syndicated loan market. J.
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std.
dev.
Min. Max.
r(ROA) 3806 0.022 0.110 0.001 6.224
Market value 3408 6.897 2.132 0.864 12.468
Sharpe 3526 20.284 26.209 21.993 339.703
ROA 3704 0.121 0.111 2.004 0.766
Firm size 3824 6.890 1.915 0.003 12.410
Firm efﬁciency 3827 0.961 0.800 0.001 7.567
Firm liquidity 3185 1.800 1.608 0.059 36.508
Firm age 3982 20.933 16.799 1 59
Borrowing spread 7362 210.41 136.27 7.00 1200.0
General covenants 7362 1.286 1.604 0 1
Bank capital 7359 0.089 0.039 0.047 0.493
Bank risk-weighted capital 5259 0.114 0.035 0.001 0.376
Bank Tier 1 capital 5259 0.081 0.027 0.001 0.368
Bank non-performing
loans
6019 0.016 0.017 0.000 0.091
Bank loan-loss provisions 7359 0.009 0.010 0.000 0.063
Bank loan charge-offs 7359 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.072
Bank size 7362 18.635 1.595 11.817 20.980
Bank Z-score 3032 1.578 1.795 40.893 7.702
Notes: The table reports the number of observations, mean, standard deviation,
minimum, and maximum of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
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sure of ﬁrms’ risk (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009). We calculate this
measure using a rolling 12-quarter horizon of the returns on assets
(ROA). The higher is the volatility of earnings, the higher the riski-
ness of the ﬁrm. The second dependent variable of our study is the
natural logarithm of the ﬁrms’ market value of common stock. This
is a market-oriented measure of ﬁrm performance and, thus, it
complements the accounting-based ratio by being more forward-
looking.2
Our third measure is the accounting-data equivalent of the
Sharpe ratio (e.g., Robb and Watson, 2012; Delis et al., 2014). We
calculate this ratio using the book value of ROA over r(ROA), the
latter again calculated using a 12-quarter horizon. This ratio mea-
sures the risk-adjusted returns of each ﬁrm at each point in time.
By discounting the returns on assets, we provide a cleaner measure
of returns, which is directly comparable across industries with
inherently different levels of risk. The last measure of ﬁrm perfor-
mance is the simple ROA, which is the most standard measure of
ﬁrm performance in the corporate performance literature (e.g.,
Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Hitt et al., 1997).33.2. Measures of bank credit risk and capital
We use three variables to measure each of ex post bank credit
risk and capital. For credit risk, we use the ratios of non-performing
loans to total loans, loan-loss provisions to total loans, and loan
charge-offs to total loans (see e.g., Grier, 2007). Consistent with
our theoretical considerations, all these measures are ex post mea-
sures of bank credit risk, while they complement each other in a
number of ways.
Speciﬁcally, non-performing loans differ from loan charge-offs
in that the former are assets that are past due 90 days or more as
to principal or interest, or where reasonable doubt exists as to
timely collection. In contrast, loan charge-offs occur when a loan
is de facto an irrecoverable bad loan. The pairwise correlation coef-
ﬁcient between the two ratios in our sample is equal to 0.77. In2 An alternative measure to the log of the market value would be Tobin’s q;
however, a recent literature suggests that Tobin’s q is an endogenous measure of
performance. Speciﬁcally, Dybvig and Warachka (2013) criticize Tobin’s q on the basis
that scale inefﬁciency due to underinvestment lowers ﬁrm performance but increases
Tobin’s q.
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ing, as it represent the expense set aside by the bank for loan
defaults (charge-offs). Thus, loan-loss provisions are very highly
correlated with loan charge-offs, as the bank assigns a value for
provisions approximately equal to the loans written off. Indeed,
we ﬁnd that the pairwise correlation coefﬁcient in our sample is
equal to 0.95.
With respect to bank capital, we use the ratio of risk-based capi-
tal to risk-weighted assets and we complement it with the basic
ratio of total bank capital to total assets and the ratio of Tier 1 capi-
tal to risk-weighted assets. The ﬁrst ratio is the one primarily used
by bank regulators, as it includes all types of capital and the ele-
ment of risk weights. Accordingly, it is the one favored in our
empirical analysis (for details, see Grier, 2007).33.3. Control variables
In unreported regressions we experiment with more than 200
ﬁrm-level control variables that may affect ﬁrm risk and returns
(available from Compustat), loan-level variables aggregated at
the ﬁrm-level (available from Thomson One Banker), and bank-
level variables (available from the FDIC Call Reports). We resort
to the use of variables that are theoretically motivated, are not
multicollinear and show at least some statistical signiﬁcance in
some of the estimated models. Further, we also use a crisis dummy
variable for the years 2007–2008 to capture the potential adverse
effects of the subprime crisis on ﬁrm risk and performance.
At the ﬁrm level, we control for ﬁrm size, efﬁciency, liquidity,
and age. In the literature, the effect of ﬁrm size on ﬁrms’ risk and
performance is ambiguous (Delis et al., 2014), with positive forces
on performance stemming from economies of scale, while negative
forces stemming from lack of specialization, value-destroying M&A
deals, etc. Firm efﬁciency (measured here by the ratio of ﬁrm sales
to total assets), should be positively related with returns. However,
the effect of this variable on risk is also likely to be positive,
because ﬁrms with high sales to assets ratios are likely to have
higher proﬁt volatility. As a proxy for liquidity we use the so-called
current ratio (ratio of current assets to current liabilities). We
expect that the higher the current ratio, the lower ﬁrms’ risk and
the higher the performance. Also, ﬁrm age is related to shareholder
and managerial experience and we expect that, if anything, this
measure is positively related to ﬁrm performance. In addition to
these variables we control for ﬁrm ﬁxed effects in all our estimated
equations to capture any remainder unobserved characteristics of
ﬁrms.
Concerning the loan-level variables, we use the average all-in-
one spread of all the loans that are obtained by each ﬁrm in our
sample within a speciﬁc year. We expect that higher spreads are
linked to more risky and worse-performing ﬁrms because of the
pricing of the higher risk premium. Further, we use a dummy vari-
able to capture the extent to which the ﬁrm uses covenants to safe-
guard loan deals. We expect that these ﬁrms are in general less
risky.
The last group of control variables is related to the characteris-
tics of the lead bank of the loan syndicate.4 We experiment with
many variables related to bank size, efﬁciency, liquidity, types of
bank risk other than credit risk, but we ﬁnd that most of these vari-
ables are statistically insigniﬁcant determinants of ﬁrm risk orNote that using this variable is, in our analysis, essentially the same with using
the respective capital-buffers variable, because there have been no alternations in the
minimum capital requirement during our sample period. Thus, subtracting the 8%
minimum from the risk-weighted capital ratio for all available observations will not
yield any changes in the empirical results or in inference.
4 We do not ﬁnd any effect stemming from the characteristics of the rest of the
banks in the syndicate.
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Table 3
The effect of risk-weighted bank capital and non-performing loans on ﬁrms’ performance.
Dependent variable: r(ROA) Market value Sharpe Proﬁtability r(ROA) Market value Sharpe Proﬁtability
Firm size 0.007⁄ 0.882⁄⁄⁄ 1.991⁄⁄⁄ 0.006 0.006⁄⁄⁄ 0.495⁄⁄⁄ 1.071 0.024⁄
(1.68) (29.48) (3.90) (1.28) (2.57) (4.57) (0.65) (1.93)
Firm efﬁciency 0.002 0.751⁄⁄⁄ 1.734⁄ 0.027⁄⁄⁄ 0.016⁄⁄⁄ 0.560⁄⁄ 0.383 0.109⁄⁄⁄
(0.84) (12.09) (1.71) (4.98) (2.93) (1.88) (0.1) (4.89)
Firm liquidity 0.000 0.075⁄⁄⁄ 0.590⁄⁄ 0.001 0.002⁄⁄ 0.026⁄⁄ 0.048 0.002
(0.35) (3.06) (2.00) (0.33) (1.89) (2.48) (0.2) (0.84)
Firm age 0.000 0.009⁄⁄⁄ 0.068 0.000⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄ 0.115⁄⁄⁄ 0.390 0.001
(0.34) (4.35) (1.25) (2.33) (2.44) (3.89) (1.42) (0.84)
Borrowing spread 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.004⁄⁄⁄ 0.030⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.000 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.010 0.000
(2.67) (9.64) (5.78) (4.55) (0.53) (2.62) (1.39) (0.28)
General covenants 0.003⁄⁄ 0.057⁄⁄ 0.544 0.008⁄⁄ 0.000 0.016 0.156 0.002
(2.53) (2.32) (1.24) (2.47) (0.88) (0.58) (0.39) (0.92)
Bank risk-weighted capital 0.075 1.038 3.762 0.535⁄⁄⁄ 0.256⁄⁄ 13.061⁄⁄⁄ 77.311 0.126
(0.63) (0.74) (0.12) (2.93) (2.34) (3.1) (0.79) (0.3)
Bank non-performing loans 0.140 8.805⁄⁄ 183.531⁄⁄ 0.010 0.401⁄⁄⁄ 2.387 576.188⁄⁄⁄ 1.579⁄⁄⁄
(0.88) (2.45) (2.13) (0.03) (2.88) (0.2) (3.05) (2.58)
Bank size 0.001 0.021 0.340 0.004⁄⁄ 0.001 0.031 2.232 0.008
(0.26) (0.90) (0.65) (2.04) (0.72) (0.39) (1.51) (1.43)
Crisis dummy 0.000 0.313⁄⁄⁄ 2.186 0.015⁄⁄ 0.003 0.517⁄ 5.038 0.003
(0.02) (3.91) (1.23) (1.99) (0.82) (1.64) (0.86) (0.21)
Observations 1913 1644 1876 1916 1913 1644 1876 1916
Notes: The ﬁrst four columns report coefﬁcient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the OLS regressions with ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. The rest of the table reports
respective results from the multiple high-dimensional ﬁxed effects model, where ﬁrm and bank ﬁxed effects are included in the regression equations. The t-statistics are
calculated from cluster-robust standard errors. The dependent variables of each regression are reported in the ﬁrst line of the table. All variables are deﬁned in Table 1. The F-
test that bank and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects are equal to zero has a p-value = 0 in all regressions. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 level,
respectively.
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with our theoretical discussion above, and thus we include the loga-
rithm of total assets along with the bank capital and credit risk vari-
ables in the regression equations. We also use variables
characterizing bank risk in general, as opposed to credit risk in par-
ticular. The most obvious measure of bank risk is the Z-score (a for-
mal deﬁnition is provided in Table 1), which serves as a proxy for the
risk of bank default or total bank risk (see e.g., Fu et al., 2014). Higher
values on the Z-score reﬂect lower risk of default. Also, similar to the
case of ﬁrm-level variables, we control for bank ﬁxed effects in all
the estimated equations.4. Empirical methodology and ﬁndings
4.1. Econometric identiﬁcation
Theoretically, our study is not intended to identify a causal rela-
tion of bank capital and credit risk on ﬁrm risk and performance.
Instead we are interested in identifying the lending channels from
risky banks to risky and non-performing ﬁrms. This implies that
the direction of causality (i.e. whether it runs from banks to ﬁrms
or vice versa) is not important in our study. On this front, we sim-
ply aim to identify associations and thus we can begin our analysis
with simple OLS models that include ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. However,
the presence of omitted variables is very much possible and this
can create a bias in our estimates of bank capital and risk.
The fact that our data set is a multilevel cross section, with
speciﬁc ﬁrms making multiple loan deals with a speciﬁc lead bank,
allows using bank and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects to control for virtually all
the omitted variables.5 This is a unique feature of our data set that
makes econometric identiﬁcation robust, as it thoroughly accounts
for any omitted variables bias. Subsequently, estimation with OLS5 The time dimension is not an issue, because the loan deals are unique (not
repeated in time). Thus, the bank and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects already incorporate the
information concerning any structural, regulatory and macroeconomic developments
common to all banks. Indeed, if we include year ﬁxed effects in our models we ﬁnd
that these ﬁxed effects are jointly statistically insigniﬁcant. To avoid over-identiﬁ-
cation of our models, we exclude the year ﬁxed effects. Below we do carry out
additional analysis to inquire about the effect of the time dimension in our ﬁndings.
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ased estimates and allows avoiding instrumental variables estima-
tors that could lead to bias due to imperfect instrumentation. The
particular methodology used is thoroughly described in Gormley
and Matsa (2014). Jiménez et al., 2012, 2014 use a similar identiﬁca-
tion method with multilevel data to avoid the same identiﬁcation
problems.
4.2. Empirical results
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 3 report the empirical results
from the OLS regressions including ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. Non-per-
forming loans are negative and statistically signiﬁcant determi-
nants of market value and the Sharpe ratio. Economically, a 1%
point increase in non-performing loans leads to a 0.088 point
reduction in the market value of ﬁrms and a 1.84 point reduction
in the Sharpe ratio. These are equivalent to approximately a 1.3%
reduction in the market value and a 9.07% reduction in the
Sharpe ratio.
The next four columns report the empirical results from the
regressions including bank non-performing loans as the measure
of credit risk. In the ﬁrst and the last two regressions, non-perform-
ing loans are now statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, with a 1%
point increase in non-performing loans increasingr(ROA) by 0.004
points. In other words, for the ﬁrm with a mean r(ROA) this
implies an economically signiﬁcant increase from 0.022 to 0.026.
The equivalent decreases in the Sharpe ratio and the ROA are also
economically signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, a 1% point increase in non-
performing loans yields a 5.8 point reduction in the Sharpe ratio
(mean equals 20.3), and a 0.016 reduction in ROA (mean equals
0.12), all of which are sizeable effects.
The bank risk-weighted capital signiﬁcantly determinesr(ROA)
and market value. In particular, the banks with a high risk-weight-
ed capital ratio seem to be associated with ﬁrms with high vari-
ability of proﬁts and low market value.6 A 1% point increase in6 We document similar results when we use the total bank capital or the Tier 1
capital ratio, except from the fact that the latter ratio has a statistically signiﬁcant
effect on the Sharpe ratio instead of the market value. These results are available upon
request.
d lower-proﬁtability ﬁrms? Evidence from the syndicated loan market. J.
Table 4
The effect of risk-weighted bank and loan-loss provisions on ﬁrms’ performance.
Dependent variable: r(ROA) Market
value
Sharpe ROA
Firm size 0.006⁄⁄⁄ 0.505⁄⁄⁄ 0.848 0.026⁄⁄
(2.78) (5.15) (0.45) (2.09)
Firm efﬁciency 0.016⁄⁄⁄ 0.550⁄⁄ 0.092 0.109⁄⁄⁄
(2.63) (1.88) (0.03) (5.07)
Firm liquidity 0.002⁄ 0.026⁄⁄⁄ 0.127 0.001
(1.85) (2.75) (0.58) (0.45)
Firm age 0.001⁄⁄ 0.075⁄⁄ 0.279 0.000
(2.12) (1.97) (1.00) (0.32)
Borrowing spread 0.000 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.012⁄ 0.000
(0.93) (3.15) (1.64) (0.29)
General covenants 0.001 0.010 0.233 0.024
(1.02) (0.33) (0.59) (1.16)
Bank risk-weighted
capital
0.256⁄⁄ 10.567⁄⁄ 85.755 0.197
(2.47) (2.58) (1.00) (0.47)
Bank loan-loss provisions 0.329⁄⁄ 11.566⁄ 198.587 1.041⁄⁄
(2.32) (1.79) (1.63) (2.06)
Bank size 0.000 0.046 1.277 0.004
(0.25) (0.57) (1.09) (0.72)
Crisis dummy 0.001 0.099 6.022⁄⁄ 0.018⁄
(0.35) (1.23) (2.39) (1.76)
Observations 1949 1672 1912 1952
Notes: The table reports coefﬁcient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from
the multiple high-dimensional ﬁxed effects model, where ﬁrm and bank ﬁxed
effects are included in the regression equations. The t-statistics are calculated from
cluster-robust standard errors. The dependent variables of each regression are
reported in the ﬁrst line of the table. All variables are deﬁned in Table 1. The F-test
that bank and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects are equal to zero has a p-value = 0 in all regressions.
The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 level,
respectively.
Table 5
The effect of risk-weighted bank capital and loan charge-offs on ﬁrms’ performance.
Dependent variable: r(ROA) Market
value
Sharpe ROA
Firm size 0.006⁄⁄ 0.509⁄⁄⁄ 0.519 0.026⁄⁄
(2.57) (5.04) (0.28) (2.02)
Firm efﬁciency 0.016⁄⁄⁄ 0.561⁄ 0.242 0.109⁄⁄⁄
(2.92) (1.90) (0.07) (4.98)
Firm liquidity 0.002⁄ 0.027⁄⁄⁄ 0.099 0.001
(1.83) (2.93) (0.44) (0.43)
Firm age 0.001⁄⁄ 0.076⁄ 0.543 0.001
(2.20) (1.80) (1.59) (0.60)
Borrowing spread 0.000 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.010 0.000
(1.06) (3.30) (1.50) (0.82)
General covenants 0.001 0.010 0.395 0.002
(1.08) (0.32) (1.00) (0.97)
Bank risk-weighted
capital
0.254⁄⁄ 11.045⁄⁄ 35.798 0.102
(2.28) (2.58) (0.41) (0.24)
Bank loan charge-offs 0.512⁄⁄ 13.301 712.479⁄⁄⁄ 0.672
(2.75) (1.23) (2.76) (0.85)
Bank size 0.000 0.037 1.016 0.004
(0.02) (0.47) (0.86) (0.58)
Crisis dummy 0.000 0.115 5.184⁄⁄ 0.003⁄
(0.08) (1.41) (2.23) (1.73)
Observations 1949 1672 1912 1952
Notes: The table reports coefﬁcient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from
the multiple high-dimensional ﬁxed effects model, where ﬁrm and bank ﬁxed
effects are included in the regression equations. The t-statistics are calculated from
cluster-robust standard errors. The dependent variables of each regression are
reported in the ﬁrst line of the table. All variables are deﬁned in Table 1. The F-test
that bank and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects are equal to zero has a p-value = 0 in all regressions.
The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 level,
respectively.
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points. For a ﬁrm with an average r(ROA) this increase is equivalent
to an increase from 0.022 to 0.0276. These results are in line with the
theoretical literature on the moral hazard behavior of banks that
hold higher levels of capital. In other words, the role of bank capital
as a risk buffer expands the risk-bearing capacity of banks and
increases incentives to lend to riskier ﬁrms (e.g., Repullo, 2004).
In Tables 4 and 5 we replicate the results of the last four col-
umns of Table 3, this time using loan-loss provisions and loan
charge-offs as our measure of credit risk, respectively. The regres-
sions of both tables show a qualitatively very similar picture with
that of Table 3, even though the number of available observations
differs substantially. Speciﬁcally, loan-loss provisions increase the
r(ROA) of ﬁrms and reduce their market value and ROA. Also,
the effect of a 1% point increase in loan-loss-provisions is eco-
nomically smaller compared to the respective effect of non-per-
forming loans. In turn, the loan charge-offs also increase the
r(ROA) and decrease the Sharpe ratio. The economic signiﬁcance
of the loan charge-offs is the largest among the three bank cred-
it-risk variables in the Sharpe-ratio equations, which is intuitive
given the de facto increase in the credit risk reﬂected by this
variable.
In Table 6 we report the results from the equations that include
the bank Z-score instead of the bank risk-weighted capital.7 We do
not include both these variables in the same equation because the Z-
score includes information on bank capital. We only report the
results based on the non-performing loans ratio as the measure of
credit risk, which is also included given that credit and total bank
risk are two relatively different notions. Even though these regres-
sions have a somewhat lower number of observations, the non-per-
forming loans ratio is the one favored by the majority of the banking7 We also use the probability of default (Fu et al., 2014) and the results are very
similar.
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We ﬁnd that the bank Z-score is positively related with ﬁrms’
market value, the Sharpe ratio and the ROA and this effect is
strongly statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Moreover, the
effect of the Z-score is independent of the respective effect of
non-performing loans, implying that several types of bank risk
other than credit risk have a direct bearing on the bank–ﬁrm rela-
tionships. Evidently, banks with a lower probability of defaults
(higher Z-score) are likely to be associated with better-performing
ﬁrms.
We examine the sensitivity of our results using a number of
additional robustness tests (results are available on request) on
the potential in-sample heterogeneity of our estimates due to
other bank characteristics and macroeconomic developments.
First, we examine whether the results change in the periods before
and after 2007 (the year of the subprime crisis origination), by
including the interaction term of our bank credit-risk and capital
variables with a dummy that takes the value one in the period
2000–2006 and zero otherwise. However, these interaction terms
are statistically insigniﬁcant.
Second, we examine whether there is interplay between bank
credit risk and bank capital in determining ﬁrms’ risk and perfor-
mance. Given the ﬁnding that both bank credit risk and risk-based
capital have a positive effect on the variability of returns, this is a
test of the hypothesis that for banks with high capital ratios, the
positive relation between bank credit risk and ﬁrms risk will be
more signiﬁcant for those banks with higher capital. However, this
interaction term is also statistically insigniﬁcant.
Finally, we experiment with interaction terms of bank credit-
risk with bank size and market power, as well as of bank capital
with bank size and market power. For market power we introduce
a Lerner index of market power, estimated as in Delis et al. (2014).
However, even these interaction terms are found to be statistically
insigniﬁcant.d lower-proﬁtability ﬁrms? Evidence from the syndicated loan market. J.
Table 6
The effect of non-performing loans and total bank risk on ﬁrms’ performance.
Dependent variable: r(ROA) Market
value
Sharpe ROA
Firm size 0.008⁄⁄⁄ 0.559⁄⁄⁄ 2.569 0.012
(2.77) (5.01) (0.62) (1.42)
Firm efﬁciency 0.023⁄⁄⁄ 1.461⁄⁄⁄ 11.840 0.005
(3.42) (5.89) (1.55) (0.29)
Firm liquidity 0.002 0.029 1.042⁄⁄ 0.008⁄⁄⁄
(1.41) (1.15) (2.33) (4.90)
Firm age 0.001⁄⁄ 0.034⁄ 0.374⁄ 0.001
(2.09) (1.64) (1.72) (0.84)
Borrowing spread 0.000 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.008 0.000
(1.16) (3.00) (0.97) (0.23)
General covenants 0.001⁄ 0.008 0.514 0.001
(1.87) (0.37) (1.22) (0.56)
Bank non-performing
loans
0.434⁄⁄⁄ 14.361⁄⁄⁄ 477.616⁄⁄⁄ 1.157⁄⁄⁄
(2.71) (2.67) (3.26) (3.25)
Bank Z-score 0.005 0.757⁄⁄⁄ 8.236⁄⁄⁄ 0.098⁄⁄⁄
(1.37) (6.35) (3.88) (11.27)
Bank size 0.001 0.029 0.691 0.002
(0.74) (0.87) (0.65) (0.59)
Crisis dummy 0.000 0.045 5.709⁄ 0.009
(0.13) (0.57) (1.91) (1.62)
Observations 2346 2078 2313 2352
Notes: The table reports coefﬁcient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from
the multiple high-dimensional ﬁxed effects model, where ﬁrm and bank ﬁxed
effects are included in the regression equations. The t-statistics are calculated from
cluster-robust standard errors. The dependent variables of each regression are
reported in the ﬁrst line of the table. All variables are deﬁned in Table 1. The F-test
that bank and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects are equal to zero has a p-value = 0 in all regressions.
The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 level,
respectively.
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This article examines the proﬁle of banks that lend to ﬁrms with
higher risk and lower proﬁtability. We use a unique data set of syn-
dicated loans, which has two important advantages. First, it allows
building a sample on bank–ﬁrm relationships where all the impor-
tant observable characteristics of ﬁrms and banks are available
through a merging process with other databases. Second, it repre-
sents a multilevel cross-sectional data set, with the important fea-
ture of repeated observations across ﬁrms and banks. This allows
controlling for essentially all the bank and ﬁrm characteristics
through the use of bank and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects.
We examine the proﬁle of banks in terms of their levels of credit
risk and capital, which are the variables characterizing the theore-
tical nexus in the decision to lend in the majority of the theoretical
literature. We ﬁnd that banks with high credit risk de facto lend to
ﬁrms with higher proﬁt volatility, lower market value and lower
proﬁtability ratios (simple or risk-adjusted). These effects are so
economically signiﬁcant and document an important adverse
selection mechanism in ﬁnancial intermediation, whereby the
risky banks are afﬁliated with risky and worse-performing ﬁrms.
We also ﬁnd that banks with relatively high levels of risk-weighted
capital are associated with ﬁrms with higher volatility of returns
and lower market value.
Taken together with the fact that we examine the syndicated
loan market, which involves relative large banks and ﬁrms and is
deemed to be quite competitive and transparent, our results have
important policy implications. With respect to bank credit risk,
our results show that there is a special type of a moral hazard
mechanism potentially working in both directions, from ﬁrms to
banks and vice versa. If this mechanism is considered as a bad
equilibrium in a multiple equilibrium framework (the good one
being the relationship lending between healthy banks and ﬁrms),
then this is a recipe for market failure.Please cite this article in press as: Iosiﬁdi, M., Kokas, S. Who lends to riskier an
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important theoretical literature on the way higher levels of capital
inﬂict adverse selection and moral hazard in the lending behavior
of banks. Subsequently, this creates room for prudential supervi-
sion, whereby the bank regulators should monitor the projects
undertaken by overly risky and well-capitalized banks more close-
ly. This proposal is quite timely in light of the discussion surround-
ing the newly introduced leverage ratio (in terms of Tier 1 capital)
under Basel III. Evidently, the emphasis on the types of bank–ﬁrm
relationships, especially in large loan deals, based on credit risk is
quite important in light of the higher capital requirements
imposed on banks. Our results suggest that targeting credit risk
more directly could enhance the soundness of the bank lending
activity and could break this multiplicity of equilibria, yielding a
more stable syndicated loan market. The emphasis on bank capital
alone, despite promoting a safer banking environment, has the
limitation that it also exacerbates the adverse selection and moral
hazard problems in the market for loans.
Certainly, further analysis is needed to identify which loans
(and borrowers) are very risky and which ones are required as a
means to improve the growth potential of the relatively worse-per-
forming ﬁrms. To this end, potential extensions of research include
separating the ﬁrms into risky and less risky ones or analyzing the
effect of bank capital and risk on the probability of ﬁrm growth or
default. Identifying causal mechanisms around these relationships
are clear challenges for future research.References
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